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Is prior director experience valuable? 
Evidence from new director appointments 
 
 
Abstract 
Prior studies have investigated numerous director characteristics (e.g. professional 
expertise, qualifications and independence), yet they have failed to examine the prior 
experience of directors as directors. Using a hand-collected dataset, this paper 
examines the market reaction at appointment of new non-executive directors to 
determine whether shareholders value the prior directorial experience of appointees. 
We find that both the depth (number of prior years) and breadth (number of current 
directorships) of the appointee’s director experience is valued by shareholders at the 
time of appointment. In particular, the market reaction is strongest: (1) for appointees 
with the most prior director experience, i.e. those with two or more other current 
directorships in listed companies and four or more years of director experience, and 
(2) when experienced appointees join less experienced boards. Further analysis 
indicates that experienced directors are valued for their general experience and not 
specialist experience related to board committees or specific industries.  
 
Keywords: board of directors, director appointments, director experience. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate directors are required to perform numerous complex tasks, e.g. monitor 
firm operations and management, analyse merger and acquisition opportunities, 
evaluate capital raising options, and hire and set the remuneration of top executives. 
Prior studies show that executive experience and specialist legal, financial or industry-
specific skills assist directors in performing these tasks (Dass et al., 2010; Defond et 
al., 2005; Fich, 2005; Guner et al., 2008; Krishnan et al., 2011). In this study, we 
propose that prior experience as a director (i.e. experience performing the tasks 
required of directors) is the most relevant expertise directors can possess.  
In specific settings, previous research shows that directors with prior 
experience make better acquisition decisions (Kroll et al., 2008; McDonald et al., 
2008) and have more influence on the board (Westphal and Milton, 2000). Other 
studies that have examined a potential measure of the experience of individual 
directors, the number of current directorships in other listed companies, have focused 
on the constructs of “busyness” or “connectedness” and not director experience 
(Ferris et al., 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Field et al., 2011; Larcker et al., 2010).  
 In this study we examine whether the prior directorial experience of 
appointees is valued by shareholders at the time of appointment. We focus on the 
appointment of new directors to firms, as this is a cleaner setting to examine the prior 
director experience the appointee brings to the hiring firm. Using panel analysis to 
relate director experience to firm performance would mix the experience of directors 
within the firm with their experience from outside the firm. Examining the market 
reaction to the appointment of new directors also allows us to determine whether prior 
director experience is a characteristic that is valued by shareholders.  
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 We measure the prior director experience of appointees in a number of ways – 
the number of years of experience the appointee has as a director of other listed 
companies, the number of current directorships the appointee has in other listed 
companies and combinations of these two variables. These measures allow us to 
investigate the relative importance of both the breadth (number of current 
directorships) and depth (number of prior years) of the appointee’s experience as a 
director. Our methodology also allows us to isolate the incremental effect of director 
experience by controlling for other director and hiring firm characteristics. We 
specifically control for the appointee’s independence, professional expertise and 
qualifications, and also control for other hiring board and firm characteristics.  
  We find that both the depth and breadth of the appointee’s prior director 
experience is valued by the market at the time of appointment. The market reaction is 
strongest for appointees with the most director experience, i.e. those with two or more 
other current directorships in listed companies and four or more years of director 
experience. This indicates that a mix of depth and breadth of experience as a director 
is the most valuable combination. We also relate the director experience of the 
appointee to the existing director experience on the hiring board. Using a number of 
measures of hiring board experience, we find that the incremental value of the 
appointee’s experience as a director is only significant to hiring boards with less 
experience and is insignificant to hiring boards with more experience. This suggests 
that experienced directors are not valuable additions to all firms.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides 
details of prior research and develops hypotheses. Section 3 explains the data and 
variables. Section 4 outlines the methodology and discusses the results. Conclusions 
are provided in section 5.  
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2. Hypothesis Development 
The board of director literature can be separated into two areas. The first area 
examines properties of the board as a whole. Recent reviews are provided by Adams 
et al. (2010) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003). The second area examines the 
characteristics of individual directors. Studies in this area generally relate the market 
reaction at the appointment of new directors to various director characteristics 
(Yermack, 2006). This study is primarily related to the second area of the literature 
that examines the characteristics of individual directors.  
 Prior studies have found that the appointment of outside directors with certain 
characteristics are viewed favourably by investors. Fich (2005) shows that the market 
reaction at appointment is higher for outside directors that have extensive executive 
experience, i.e. are CEOs of other listed companies. Defond et al. (2005) find that 
outside directors with financial expertise relevant to the hiring firm’s audit committee 
are viewed favourably by investors. Other similar studies show that the market 
reaction at the appointment of new directors is related to independence, CEO 
involvement, interlocking directorships and firm size (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; 
Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). More recent studies also provide further evidence 
that the expertise of directors (e.g. industry knowledge, banking expertise and legal 
expertise) has an effect on board actions (Dass et al., 2010; Guner et al., 2008; 
Krishnan et al., 2011). 
While prior studies have provided valuable insights, it is somewhat surprising 
that researchers have not fully investigated the experience of directors as directors. 
This is unusual as the management literature has provided evidence that the 
effectiveness of directors is related to their past experience as a director. Westphal and 
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Milton (2000) find that experienced directors are able to interpret business situations 
more effectively and Hillman and Dalziel (2003) contend that greater experience can 
enhance a director’s ability to monitor firm performance and provide advice to the 
firm. Westphal (1999) find that experienced directors develop ties with other directors 
and executives more easily. In addition, Kroll et al. (2008) and McDonald et al. 
(2008) both show that directors with more relevant experience make better corporate 
acquisition decisions.  
One reason why director experience has not been investigated in the finance 
literature is the lack of disclosure of such experience in the annual reports of firms in 
the United States. Another possible reason is that studies that have examined a 
possible measure of director experience, the number of current directorships in other 
listed companies, have focused on the constructs of “busyness” or “connectedness” 
and not director experience (Ferris et al., 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Field et 
al., 2011; Larcker et al., 2010). The results of these studies have also been mixed, 
with Ferris et al. (2003) finding an insignificant market reaction to the appointment of 
busy directors (those with two or more other directorships), while Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) find a positive market reaction to the departure of busy outside 
directors.  
We overcome these obstacles by examining the experience of directors in 
Australia, where the reporting requirements provide greater detail on the current and 
past experience of directors in listed companies. In particular, Section 300 of the 
Corporations Act 2001 in Australia and Australian Stock Exchange listing rules 
require firms to disclose the skills, experience and expertise relevant to the position of 
director held by each director in office. These disclosures include all directorships 
held by directors in the past three years, with firms generally also reporting the period 
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of each directorship.
1
 We hand collect this data from annual reports to construct 
numerous measures of director experience – the number of years of experience a 
director has as a director of other listed companies, the number of current 
directorships a director has in other listed companies and combinations of these two 
variables.  
 Thus, this study is the first to relate the market reaction at the appointment of 
new outside directors to the prior experience the appointee has as a director. This is a 
direct test as to whether the experience the appointees have acquired as directors of 
other listed companies is deemed to be beneficial to their new directorships. Since 
directors are required to perform a range of complex tasks (e.g. monitor firm 
operations, analyse merger and acquisition opportunities, evaluate capital raising 
options, and hire and set the remuneration of top executives) and directors come from 
a range of different backgrounds that may or may not equip them with the skills to 
perform these tasks, we propose that appointees with prior experience performing 
these tasks as directors of listed companies are likely to be perceived as more 
effective directors by shareholders. Our first hypothesis is stated as: 
 
H1: The market reaction to the appointment of non-executive 
directors is positively related to the appointee’s prior experience as 
a director. 
 
We also examine the effect the experience of the hiring board has on the 
market reaction to the prior director experience of the appointee. While not 
specifically examining this relationship, Ferris et al. (2003) provide some evidence 
                                                 
1 When firms do not specifically report the period of each directorship, we track the director’s tenure in 
that directorship from the specific company. In a small number of cases where this information is not 
available, we assume the directorships have tenures of 3 years. This assumption does not influence our 
reported results.   
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that a relationship exists between the experience of the appointee and the experience 
of the hiring board. They find a positive market reaction when appointees with 
multiple directorships join hiring boards that do not contain directors with multiple 
directorships. When appointees with multiple directorships join hiring boards that 
already contain directors with multiple directorships the market reaction is 
insignificant. Similar analysis has also been conducted by Defond et al. (2005) to 
identify the effect of the first versus subsequent financial expert joining audit 
committees. As we expect the usefulness of the appointee’s prior experience as a 
director to be most valuable to hiring boards with less experience, our second 
hypotheses is stated as: 
 
H2: The appointee’s prior experience as a director is most valuable 
to hiring boards with less experience. 
 
3. Data and Variables 
3.1 Sample 
Our sample of non-executive director appointments is obtained from the Boardroom 
database from Connect4. This database analyses company announcements and records 
the date of all director appointments to Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listed 
companies. Our preliminary sample started with 3,157 outside director appointments 
to ASX-listed companies between January 1, 2004 and June 30, 2006. We then 
undertook stringent measures to ensure the non-executive director appointment 
announcements are indeed new appointments and are not contaminated by other news 
announcements. We removed appointments where we could not confirm the 
announcement date of the appointment on the ASX Company Announcement 
database (741), where the director is not new to the company (718), where other news 
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was announced during the period from the day before to the day after the appointment 
announcement (704), where there were multiple appointment announcements on the 
same day (211) and where insufficient share price and financial data is available (360). 
These restrictions limit our sample to interim appointments, i.e. those not voted on at 
annual general meetings, which reduce the likelihood that the appointments were 
anticipated by the market.
2
 After these restrictions, our final sample comprises 423 
non-executive director appointments made by 332 companies.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the appointment announcements across 
months of the year. The greatest number of observations is in May (50) and the least 
in November (19). The appointment announcements are spread across the year, which 
indicates that they are not clustered around any particular reporting dates. In total, 
there are 149 observations from 2004, 183 observations from 2005 and 91 
observations from 2006. 
 
3.2 Variables 
Appointee director and hiring board characteristics are hand-collected from company 
annual reports on the Connect4 Annual Report database and appointment 
announcements. Hiring company financial and share price data are obtained from 
Aspect and Sirca databases. Table 1 provides definitions of the variables used in this 
study. Our main variables of interest are Years (number of years experience the 
appointee has as a director of other listed companies) and Directorships (number of 
current directorships the appointee has in other listed companies). In our analysis, we 
also identify directors with specific types of director experience. Dir2+ is a dummy 
                                                 
2 As interim appointments are made by the board there is less chance for the market to anticipate this 
news. In contrast, appointments conducted at the annual general meeting of shareholders require the 
company to circulate the list of director candidates in advance, which provides the market with 
information about potential new appointments before voting to elect the candidates takes place.  
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variable equal to one when the appointee has two or more current directorships in 
other listed companies.
3
  Dir2+Yr1-3 is a dummy variable equal to one when the 
appointee has two or more current directorships in other listed companies and 1-3 
years experience as a director of listed companies. Dir2+Yr4+ is a dummy variable 
equal to one when the appointee has two or more current directorships in other listed 
companies and 4 or more years experience as a director of listed companies. 
An advantage of our study is that we examine the incremental effect of the 
appointee’s experience as a director while controlling for other director characteristics 
highlighted by the previous literature. A number of studies have examined the 
professional expertise of new directors. For example, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) 
find a higher stock market reaction when directors come from banks or other financial 
corporations. DeFond et al. (2005) find that the market reaction to new director 
appointments is higher if the director has financial expertise that is relevant to the 
company’s audit committee. Similarly, Fich (2005) shows that announcement returns 
are higher if the director has expertise as a CEO of another listed company. Consistent 
with these studies, we categorize appointee directors into the following professional 
expertise groups: academic, banker, consultant, executive, financial/accounting 
expert, lawyer, politician and current CEO of another listed company. As Australia 
has an abundance of mining and health-related companies, we also introduce the 
additional occupation groups of engineer, scientist and medical doctor.
4
 
Since directors in Australia are required by section 300 of the Corporations 
Act 2001 to disclose their level of education and other relevant qualifications in 
annual reports, we are able to distinguish between directors that have obtained 
                                                 
3 Some prior studies have labelled these directors as “busy” directors (Ferris et al., 2003; Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006). 
4 Directors are allocated to professional expertise groups based on their descriptions in appointment 
announcements and annual reports. If a director has experience in two or more expertise groups, then 
we use the classification in which the director has the most experience.  
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bachelor, master or PhD degrees. This is consistent with prior studies, such as Fich 
(2005), who highlights directors with MBA or law degrees. Our qualification 
variables are therefore coded as no degree, law degree, other bachelor degrees, MBA, 
other master degrees and PhD.
5
 
Director independence has been the subject of numerous studies. We therefore 
distinguish between independent and non-independent directors. As an additional 
measure of independence, we also include a dummy variable if the appointee holds 
shares in the hiring company (Equity). To ensure we are measuring the director 
experience the appointee brings to the hiring board and not other characteristics of the 
appointee, we also include dummy variables to highlight when the appointee is 
bringing new expertise and a new qualification to the hiring board. We also include a 
dummy variable to distinguish between the creation of a new board seat and an 
appointment that replaces a departing director. 
CEO power and the CEO’s ability to influence the appointment process have 
also been found to result in appointments that are viewed less favourably by the 
market. Directors who serve on boards with interlocking directors are also viewed less 
favourably. Therefore, following Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), we include dummy 
variables to indicate when the CEO is involved in the appointment process, when the 
CEO also holds the position of Chairman and when there are interlocking 
directorships. We also include the tenure of the CEO as another measure of CEO 
power. The market reaction to new director appointments has also been found to be 
related to company size, performance, growth prospects and existing board 
independence (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Fich, 2005). We therefore include control 
variables to isolate the effect of these influences.  
                                                 
5 Qualification dummy variables are for the highest degree only. The order is PhD, MBA, other master 
degrees, LLB and other bachelor degrees.  
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 displays summary statistics for appointee and hiring firm characteristics. 
Appointee directors have a range of prior director experience. Years of experience in 
other listed companies ranges from 0 to 21 years with an average of 2.37 years. 
Number of other directorships in listed companies ranges from 0 to 6 with an average 
of 0.70. In the professional expertise classifications, 35 percent of appointees are 
general business executives, 17 percent are bankers, 14 percent are financial experts, 
9 percent are engineers, 6 percent are lawyers, 6 percent are scientists, 5 percent are 
CEOs, 4 percent are consultants, 2 percent are academics, and 1 percent are medical 
doctors or politicians.  
With respect to qualifications, 11 percent have law degrees, 31 percent have 
other bachelor degrees, 9 percent have MBAs, 9 percent have other master degrees, 
10 percent have PhDs and the remaining 30 percent have no degree. A total of 80 
percent of appointees are classified as independent and 14 percent have an equity 
interest in the hiring company. Of the new appointees, 46 percent bring new 
professional expertise to the hiring board and 29 percent bring a new qualification to 
the hiring board. In addition, 32 percent of the appointments are new seats on the 
board rather than replacing a departing director. 
As the appointing firms come from the complete range of ASX-listed 
companies there is variation in size from a minimum of less than $10 million in total 
assets to a maximum of $411.31 billion. The mean (median) sample firm has total 
assets of $2.94 billion ($50 million), return on assets of -11.18 percent (0.46 percent), 
a market-to-book ratio of 3.07 (2.12), debt-to-total-assets ratio of 0.35 (0.33), board 
size of 4.53 directors (4.00 directors) and board independence of 46 percent (50 
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percent). The average hiring firm CEO has tenure of 5.03 years and is involved in the 
appointment of new directors in 83 percent of the observations. There is a 5 percent 
incidence of interlocking directorships with the appointee and 14 percent incidence of 
Chairman-CEO duality. The average tenure of the hiring board directors is 4.82 years. 
The average total director experience of the hiring board is 31.79 years and 3.58 other 
current directorships in listed companies. A total of 42 percent of hiring boards have 
one or more directors with two or more current directorships in other listed companies 
and 4 or more years experience as a director of listed companies. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Our main empirical analysis is divided into two sections. The first section relates the 
market reaction to the appointment of non-executive directors to the prior director 
experience of the appointee. The second section examines the effect hiring board 
experience has on the market reaction to the appointee’s prior director experience. In 
our analysis, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the appointment 
announcement are calculated following the standard event study methodology of 
Dodd and Warner (1983). Market model parameters are estimated from 250 trading 
days to 20 trading days prior to the announcement date. Results are presented for 3-
day CARs (-1,+1). However, all analysis is also conducted using 2-day and 5-day 
event periods, using average returns over the estimation period and excess returns 
instead of abnormal returns during the event windows, with results consistent with 
those presented.  
 
4.1 Director Experience  
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In this section, we test Hypothesis 1 by relating the market reaction at the 
appointment of non-executive directors to the prior directorial experience of the 
appointee. The director experience of the appointee is measured from two 
dimensions – the number of years of experience the appointee has as a director of 
other listed companies (Years) and the number of current directorships the appointee 
has in other listed companies (Directorships).  
 In Table 3 we separate each measure of the appointee’s director experience 
into three sub-groups and present the market reaction at appointment for each group. 
Panel A shows that 150 appointees have no prior experience as a listed company 
director, 176 appointees have 1-3 years of prior experience and 97 appointees have 4 
or more years of prior experience. For Directorships, 248 appointees have no other 
current directorships in listed companies, 99 appointees have one directorship and 76 
appointees have two or more directorships.  
We find the market reaction is significantly positive for the most experienced 
appointees, i.e. those with four or more years of prior director experience and those 
with two or more current directorships in other listed companies. These results are 
consistent across the three different methodologies used to calculate abnormal and 
excess returns and provide some initial evidence that the appointee’s prior experience 
as a director is valued by shareholder at the time of appointment. However, we also 
find positive excess returns for appointees with no other current directorships, which 
reminds us that other director characteristics (unrelated to prior director experience) 
are also related to the market reaction at appointment.  
 In Panel B, we recognize that the two measures of the appointee’s prior 
director experience need not be independent, so we construct a 3x3 table of the two 
measures. Each cell reports the market reaction, t-statistic and number of appointees 
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(in square brackets). The analysis shows that the market reaction is only significantly 
positive for the 36 appointees with two or more directorships and 1-3 years of 
experience, and the 39 appointees with two more directorships and 4 or more years of 
experience. These results show that it is the combination of years of experience as a 
director and other current directorships that is valued highest by shareholders at the 
time of appointment.  
 The preceding analysis, while informative, suffers from two limitations. It 
does not control for other director and hiring firm characteristics that may be related 
to the market reaction at appointment. It also does not show that the market reaction 
for appointees with more director experience is significantly higher than that for 
appointees with less director experience. These limitations are overcome in our 
multivariate analysis. 
 Table 4 presents the results of our model relating the CARs (-1,+1) at the 
announcement of our sample of non-executive director appointments to the director 
experience of the appointees, while controlling for other director and hiring firm 
characteristics. In the first regression, we find the coefficient on Years is insignificant 
but the coefficient on Directorships is positive. This indicates that the market reaction 
at appointment is higher for appointees with more directorships in other listed 
companies but is unrelated to the number of years of prior experience the appointee 
has as a director. As our prior analysis suggests the market reaction is strongest for 
appointees with two or more other directorships, we replace the continuous variable, 
Directorships, with the dummy variable, Dir2+, in the second regression. We find a 
positive coefficient on Dir2+, which indicates that the market reaction is significantly 
higher for appointees with two or more other directorships than for all other 
appointees. 
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 Since our prior analysis also indicates that the market reaction is highest for 
appointees with a combination of two or more other directorships and 1-3 years of 
director experience, or two or more other directorships and 4 or more years of director 
experience, we include the dummy variables, Dir2+Yr1-3 and Dir2+Yr4+, in the 
third and fourth regressions. We find the coefficients on the two variables are of a 
similar magnitude but only the coefficient on Dir2+Yr4+ is significantly positive in 
the fourth regression. This indicates that the market reaction at appointment is only 
significantly higher for appointees with the most prior directorial experience, i.e. 
those with two or more other current directorships in listed companies and four or 
more years of prior director experience. The magnitude of the coefficient on 
Dir2+Yr4+ indicates that the market reaction is on average 1.78 percent higher for 
appointees with the most prior director experience.  
 This analysis was conducted while controlling for the professional expertise, 
qualifications and independence of the appointee, as well as a range of hiring board 
and hiring firm characteristics. Within these control variables we find the market 
reaction at appointment is significantly lower for appointees with expertise as medical 
doctors and politicians, when there are interlocking directorships between the 
appointee and the hiring board, and when the hiring CEO has longer tenure. The 
expertise results suggest that medical doctors and politicians are value-decreasing 
appointments in Australia, possibly because these skills can be accessed when needed 
and do not need to be on the board in full-time roles. The remaining results are 
consistent with prior literature (e.g. Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). 
 
4.2 Hiring Board Experience 
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In this section, we test Hypothesis 2 by examining the effect the experience of the 
hiring board has on the market reaction to the appointee’s director experience. We 
hypothesise that the director experience of the appointee is most valuable to hiring 
boards with less experience. We use a number of variables to measure the experience 
of the hiring board – average tenure of the directors on the hiring board, tenure of the 
CEO, total years of director experience of the hiring board directors, total number of 
outside directorships of the hiring board directors and a dummy variable to indicate 
the presence of at least one very experienced director (Dir2+Yr4+) on the hiring 
board.
6
 We split our sample into two sub-samples above the median and equal to or 
below the median for each continuous variable. We then repeat the regression analysis 
presented in Table 4 on the two sub-samples.
7
  
 Table 5 presents the results of this analysis. For each measure of hiring board 
experience we report the regression coefficients for Directorships, Dir2+ and 
Dir2+Yr4+. These coefficients come from the same models presented in 
specifications 1, 2 and 4 of Table 4. For brevity, the coefficients on the control 
variables are not displayed but are consistent with those reported in Table 4.
 8
  In 
Panel A, we find that the coefficients on the three measures of the appointee’s director 
experience are only significant in the sub-sample where the average tenure of the 
hiring board directors is equal to or less than the median of 4 years. In Panel B, we 
find similar results with the coefficients on the three variables only significant when 
                                                 
6 We focus on direct measures of the experience of the hiring board rather than using more general firm 
characteristics, such as firm age or size, as proxies for firms’ need for director experience (Field et al., 
2011). 
7 This analysis shows us in which sub-samples the market reaction to the appointment of experienced 
directors is significantly higher than the market reaction to other appointees. This is a direct test of our 
research question – when is prior director experience valuable. We do not interact the appointee 
experience measures with the hiring board experience variables as we are not specifically interested in 
when appointee experience is more (or less) valuable than average. 
8 The number of experienced appointees in each sub-sample is quite similar. For example, the ratio of 
Dir2+Yr4+ observations in each sub-sample is 19:20, 26:13, 18:21, 18:21 and 22:17 for the five hiring 
board experience variables presented in Table 5.  
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the tenure of the hiring firm CEO is equal to or less than the median of 3 years. These 
results indicate that the incremental value of the appointee’s experience as a director 
is only significant in firms where the hiring board and CEO are less experienced 
(shorter tenure).  
 However, while these two measures of tenure account for the experience of 
the hiring board (and CEO) inside the hiring firm they do not take into account the 
director experience of the hiring board outside of the hiring firm. In Panels C and D 
we report the results for the total years of director experience and total number of 
outside directorships of the hiring board directors. In Panel C, we again find that the 
coefficients on the three measures of the appointee’s director experience are only 
significant in the sub-sample with less hiring board experience. In Panel D, we find 
the coefficients are insignificant in both sub-samples. These results suggest that the 
incremental value of the appointee’s experience as a director is significant in firms 
where the hiring board has less years of director experience, but is unrelated to the 
number of outside directorships.  
 In Panel E, we use our combined measure of director experience (Dir2+Yr4+) 
and a dummy variable to indicate which hiring boards already have at least one 
director that has both two or more outside directorships and four or more years of 
director experience. We find the coefficients on the three measures of the appointee’s 
director experience are only significant in the sub-sample where the hiring board does 
not already contain a very experienced director (Dir2+Yr4+). These results confirm 
that the incremental value of the appointee’s experience as a director is related to the 
existing experience of the hiring board. In fact, we find that the incremental value of 
the appointee’s experience as a director is only significant to hiring boards with less 
experience and is insignificant to hiring boards with more experience. 
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4.3 Further Analysis 
In our analysis we have documented a higher market reaction for appointees with 
more prior experience as a director. However, it is also possible that appointees with 
more prior experience as directors also have more business or life experience in 
general, which is driving the results. To overcome this concern we collect the age of 
the appointees at the time of appointment. As the age of directors is disclosed 
voluntarily we are only able to collect this for 281 out of 423 appointees. We find that 
the average age of 55.25 years of the most experienced appointees (Dir2+Yr4+) is 
insignificantly different to the age of all other appointees (54.27) and the age of other 
appointees with at least one other directorship (54.71). When we include the age 
variable in our models presented in Table 4, we find the coefficients on Directorships 
(0.0063, t=2.09), Dir2+ (0.0211, t=2.59) and Dir2+Yr4+ (0.0213, t=2.02) are 
consistent with those previously reported. Therefore we are confident that we are 
measuring the incremental value of the appointee’s experience as a director and not 
their general business or life experience. 
 As there is an increasing literature on gender differences in the boardroom, we 
also repeat our analysis including a dummy variable identifying the gender of the 
appointee. In Table 4, we find the coefficients on Directorships (0.0059, t=1.88), 
Dir2+ (0.0202, t=2.24) and Dir2+Yr4+ (0.0182, t=1.81) are consistent with those 
previously reported. This is not surprising since only 3 of 76 Dir2+ observations and 
1 of 39 Dir2+Yr4+ observations are female appointees.  
 We also examine whether the incremental value of the appointee’s experience 
as a director is driven by general or specific director experience. For example, it may 
be the case that the market reaction is highest for the most experienced appointees 
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(Dir2+Yr4+) as they bring a range of director experience to the hiring firm. 
Alternatively, the market reaction may be higher as these appointees have experience 
related to a specific board committee (e.g. audit committee specialists). We therefore 
trace the board committee assignments of the appointees in the 12-month period after 
their appointment. We exclude hiring firms that do not have board committees, which 
reduces our sample to 341 appointments. We find that the most experienced 
appointees (Dir2+Yr4+) have an average of 1.14 committee assignments, which is 
insignificantly different to the 1.34 committee assignments of all other appointees and 
1.16 committee assignments of other appointees with at least one other directorship. 
We also examine specific committees and find no significant differences. The most 
experienced appointees (Dir2+Yr4+) are assigned to audit committees 71 percent of 
the time, compared to 64 percent for all other appointees and 72 percent for other 
appointees with at least one other directorship. For remuneration and nomination 
committees the percentages are 20:27:23 and 9:16:13 respectively.  
 As a last step we also examine the profiles and other directorships of the most 
experienced appointees (Dir2+Yr4+) to see if there are any common traits that have 
not been identified by other variables in our analysis. For example, the appointees 
may be experts in mergers and acquisitions, turnarounds or industry specialists. We 
find there is considerable variation across the appointees. Few of the appointees 
highlight specific expertise in mergers and acquisitions or turnarounds. The other 
directorships of the appointees are also not clustered in particular industries, with only 
one-third having two directorships in the same industry. Most in fact have 
directorships across a diversified range of industries. For example, one appointee has 
directorships in the telecommunications, real estate, healthcare, commercial services 
and capital goods industries. Another has directorships in the biotechnology, banking, 
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health care, food and beverage, and commercial services industries. This analysis 
confirms that the most experienced appointees are valued for their general experience 
as directors and not any particular specialist experience.  
Finally, we acknowledge the possibility that our measures of director 
experience overlap with variables used in other studies to measure the connectedness 
or network centrality of directors (e.g. Larcker et al., 2010). However, we are 
confident that our results are due to director experience for two reasons. First, in our 
analysis we use a combined measure of director experience which includes years of 
experience and number of other directorships. Studies of the connectedness of 
directors focus on connections through other directorships. Second, if director 
connectedness is the primary driver of our results then our results should be strongest 
when connected directors join boards that do not have strong connections, i.e. boards 
with few outside directorships. However, in Panel D of Table 5 we find that this is not 
the case.  
   
5. Conclusion 
Prior studies investigating the characteristics of individual directors have not 
specifically examined the importance of prior director experience. This is unusual as 
the management literature has provided evidence that the effectiveness of directors is 
related to their past experience as a director. One reason why the prior directorial 
experience of directors has not been explored is the lack of disclosure of such 
experience in the annual reports of U.S. firms. We overcome this obstacle by 
examining the prior experience of directors in Australia, where the reporting 
requirements provide greater detail on the current and past experience of directors in 
listed companies.  
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We find that both the depth and breadth of the appointee’s prior director 
experience is valued by the market at the time of appointment. The market reaction is 
strongest for new appointees with the most director experience, i.e. those with two or 
more other current directorships in listed companies and four or more years of 
director experience, and when experienced appointees join less experienced boards. 
These results show that director experience is an important characteristic, but that it 
must be considered in the context of the experience of the hiring board.  
 Our results have a number of implications. First, while prior studies have 
documented a number of desirable characteristics of corporate directors, this study 
shows that prior experience as a director is a vitally important director characteristic 
that should be considered in future studies concerning individual directors and the 
diversity of the board of directors. Second, our analysis indicates that holding multiple 
outside directorships can contribute in a positive way through director experience to 
corporate boards and need not be viewed through the “busyness” construct of prior 
studies. Third, our results provide evidence that relationships exist between the 
characteristics of appointees and characteristics of hiring boards. Therefore, it is no 
longer prudent to examine the characteristics of individual directors without 
contemplating how they relate to the existing board of directors as a group. Finally, 
our additional analysis indicates that our results are not driven by any specific director 
experience. Therefore our analysis complements other studies examining specific 
expertise (e.g. financial expertise) to show that general experience as a director is 
valuable in its own right.  
 From a practical perspective, our results show that shareholders value new 
directors with the most prior director experience. This indicates that there is an 
incentive for directors, particularly those with some experience (e.g. 1-3 years and/or 
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1 other directorship) to continue to seek additional directorships to increase their level 
of experience. We acknowledge, however, that directors have limited time, so this 
conclusion is likely to only be true if directors have the capacity to take on the 
workload of additional directorships. Our results also indicate that there is an 
incentive for experienced directors to seek directorships in firms with the least 
experienced boards as this is where shareholders believe they will have the greatest 
impact.   
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Figure 1 - Distribution of sample observations
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Table 1 – Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Years 
Number of years experience the appointee has as a director of 
other listed companies. 
Directorships 
Number of current directorships the appointee has in other listed 
companies. 
Dir2+ 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee has 2 or more other 
directorships in addition to the new appointment. 
Dir2+Yr1-3 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee has 2 or more other 
directorships in addition to the new appointment and 1-3 years of 
experience as a director of other listed companies. 
Dir2+Yr4+ 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee has 2 or more other 
directorships in addition to the new appointment and 4 or more 
years of experience as a director of other listed companies. 
Academic 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s occupation is 
classified as an academic (current professorship). 
Banker 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s occupation is 
classified as a banker (e.g. experience as an investment banker, 
commercial banker, funds manager). 
CEO 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee is currently the 
CEO of another listed company. 
Consultant 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s occupation is 
classified as a consultant (e.g. management, IT or marketing). 
Doctor 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s occupation is 
classified as medical doctor. 
Engineer 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s occupation is 
classified as an engineer. 
Executive 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s occupation is 
classified as a general executive/businessperson (not classified 
into another occupation group). 
Financial 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s occupation is 
classified as a financial/accounting expert (e.g. experience as a 
CA, CPA, CFO). 
Lawyer 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s occupation is 
classified as a lawyer (e.g. experience as a practicing lawyer). 
Politician 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s occupation is 
classified as a politician (e.g. recent political office) 
Scientist 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s occupation is 
classified as a scientist. 
BA 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s highest degree is 
a bachelor degree. 
LLB 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s highest degree is 
a law degree. 
MA 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s highest degree is 
another Master degree. 
MBA 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s highest degree is 
an MBA. 
PHD 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s highest degree is 
a PhD. 
Independent 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee is classified as an 
independent director in the appointing company. 
Equity 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee holds shares in the 
appointing company. 
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New Expertise 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s expertise 
(Academic to Scientist) is not already present on the hiring board. 
New Qualification 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee’s qualification (BA 
to PHD) is not already present on the hiring board. 
New Seat 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointment is a new board 
seat (not replacing a resigning director). 
Interlock 
Dummy variable equal to one if there is an interlocking 
directorship between the appointing company and the other 
companies with which the appointee has directorships. 
CEO involved 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointing company CEO is 
involved in the appointment process (no nomination committee or 
CEO is on nomination committee). 
Chair-CEO duality 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointing company CEO is 
also the Chairman of the board of directors. 
CEO tenure 
Number of years the appointing company CEO has been in 
position. 
Independent board 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointing board is majority 
independent. 
Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets of appointing company. 
Return on Assets 
Return on assets of appointing company (winsorized at 1st 
percentile). 
Market-to-Book 
Market to book ratio of appointing company (winsorized at 99th 
percentile). 
Board tenure Average tenure of directors on the hiring board. 
Board years 
Sum of all years of directorial experience of directors on the 
hiring board. 
Board directorships 
Sum of all current outside directorships of directors on the hiring 
board. 
Board Dir2+Yr4+ 
Dummy variable equal to one if the hiring board has one or more 
directors with experience categorized as D2+Y4+. 
Board size The number of directors on the hiring board. 
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Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics  
 
This table displays mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of appointee and hiring firm characteristics. The 
sample comprises 423 non-executive director appointments to Australian Stock Exchange listed companies between 1 January 
2004 and 30 June 2006. Director and hiring board data is sourced from company annual reports on the Connect4 Annual Report 
database. Hiring firm financial data is from Aspect. See Table 1 for variable definitions.  
 
 Mean Median Min Max Std 
Appointee Characteristics 
Years 2.37 1.00 0.00 21.00 3.37 
Directorships 0.70 0.00 0.00 6.00 1.07 
Academic 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.14 
Banker 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 
CEO 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.21 
Consultant 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.20 
Doctor 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.10 
Engineer 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.28 
Executive 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 
Financial 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.35 
Lawyer 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 
Politician 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.12 
Scientist 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 
BA 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.46 
LLB 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.31 
MA 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.29 
MBA 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.29 
PHD 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.30 
Independent 0.80 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.40 
Equity 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.34 
New Expertise 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
New Qualification 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 
New Seat 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.47 
 
Hiring Firm Characteristics 
Total Assets (billions) 2.94 0.05 0.01 411.31 23.93 
Return on Assets (%) -11.18 0.46 -100 42.66 30.97 
Market-to-Book ratio 3.07 2.12 0.10 10.00 2.60 
Debt to Total Assets 0.35 0.33 0.01 1.00 0.26 
Board Size 4.53 4.00 2.00 14.00 1.91 
Board Independence 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.26 
CEO tenure 5.03 3.00 0.00 26.00 5.19 
CEO involved 0.83 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 
Interlock 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.22 
Chair-CEO duality 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.35 
Board tenure 4.82 4.00 0.33 25.67 3.46 
Board years 31.79 26.00 1.00 191.00 24.84 
Board directorships 3.58 3.00 0.00 17.00 3.39 
Board Dir2+Yr4+ 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 
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Table 3 – Director Experience 
This table displays average cumulative abnormal returns based on the market model CARs (-1,+1), the mean return model 
Avg (-1,+1) and the excess return model Excess (-1,+1), and the significance of these returns from zero. The sample 
comprises 423 non-executive director appointments to Australian Stock Exchange listed companies between 1 January 
2004 and 30 June 2006. Director and hiring board data is sourced from company annual reports on the Connect4 Annual 
Report database. Share price data is sourced from Sirca. See Table 1 for variable definitions. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
Significance at * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%. 
 
Panel A – Market Reaction at Announcement 
 
 n CARs (-1,+1) Avg (-1,+1) Excess (-1,+1) 
Years     
0 150 
0.0033 
(0.48) 
0.0037 
(0.51) 
0.0097 
(1.41) 
1-3 176 
0.0064 
(1.00) 
0.0068 
(1.06) 
0.0100 
(1.49) 
4+ 97 
0.0108 
(1.94)* 
0.0109 
(1.96)* 
0.0133 
(2.42)** 
Directorships     
0 248 
0.0057 
(1.10) 
0.0058 
(1.08) 
0.0114 
(2.12)** 
1  99 
-0.0039 
(-0.49) 
-0.0029 
(-0.36) 
-0.0007 
(-0.08) 
2+ 76 
0.0214 
(3.01)*** 
0.0218 
(2.99)*** 
0.0228 
(3.15)*** 
 
 
Panel B – Years versus Directorships CARs (-1,+1) 
 
Directorships 
Years 
0 1-3 4+ 
0 
0.0032 
(0.44) 
[144] 
0.0078 
(0.82) 
[77] 
0.0135 
(1.23) 
[27] 
1 
0.0118 
(0.46) 
[5] 
-0.0038 
(-0.32) 
[63] 
-0.0067 
(-0.76) 
[31] 
2+ 
-0.0218 
(n/a) 
[1] 
0.0212 
(1.82)* 
[36] 
0.0228 
(2.56)** 
[39] 
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Table 4 – CARs and Director Experience 
 
Regressions relate CARs (-1,+1) to director experience and control variables. The sample comprises 423 non-executive 
director appointments to Australian Stock Exchange listed companies between 1 January 2004 and 30 June 2006. Director 
and hiring board data is sourced from company annual reports on the Connect4 Annual Report database. Hiring firm 
financial data is from Aspect. Share price data is sourced from Sirca. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Models include 
robust standard errors. T-statistics are in parentheses. Significance at * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%. 
 
 CARs (-1,+1) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 
0.0069 
(0.35) 
0.0083 
(0.42) 
0.0089 
(0.46) 
0.0084 
(0.43) 
Years 
-0.0002 
(-0.19) 
-0.0002 
(-0.16) 
  
Directorships 
0.0058 
(1.84)* 
   
Dir2+  
0.0199 
(2.22)** 
  
Dir2+Yr1-3   
0.0184 
(1.44) 
 
Dir2+Yr4+    
0.0178 
(1.78)* 
Academic 
0.0233 
(0.59) 
0.0242 
(0.61) 
0.0211 
(0.53) 
0.0236 
(0.59) 
Banker 
-0.0080 
(-0.71) 
-0.0085 
(-0.76) 
-0.0093 
(-0.83) 
-0.0082 
(-0.74) 
CEO 
-0.0157 
(-1.03) 
-0.0165 
(-1.09) 
-0.0152 
(-0.96) 
-0.0133 
(-0.87) 
Consultant 
-0.0325 
(-1.44) 
-0.0325 
(-1.46) 
-0.0339 
(-1.55) 
-0.0330 
(-1.49) 
Doctor 
-0.1429 
(-2.30)** 
-0.1429 
(-2.28)** 
-0.1438 
(-2.31)** 
-0.1424 
(-2.28)** 
Engineer 
-0.0065 
(-0.38) 
-0.0062 
(-0.36) 
-0.0076 
(-0.45) 
-0.0070 
(-0.41) 
Financial 
0.0101 
(0.83) 
0.0097 
(0.80) 
0.0105 
(0.88) 
0.0101 
(0.84) 
Lawyer 
0.0127 
(0.64) 
0.0116 
(0.59) 
0.0132 
(0.67) 
0.0102 
(0.52) 
Politician 
-0.0457 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.0429 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.0459 
(-2.88)*** 
-0.0416 
(-2.60)*** 
Scientist 
0.0276 
(1.31) 
0.0274 
(1.31) 
0.0266 
(1.29) 
0.0313 
(1.51) 
BA 
0.0061 
(0.58) 
0.0058 
(0.55) 
0.0054 
(0.52) 
0.0054 
(0.51) 
LLB 
-0.0039 
(-0.22) 
-0.0031 
(-0.17) 
-0.0038 
(-0.21) 
-0.0037 
(-0.21) 
MA 
0.0018 
(0.14) 
0.0025 
(0.19) 
0.0016 
(0.12) 
0.0019 
(0.15) 
MBA 
0.0124 
(0.73) 
0.0135 
(0.79) 
0.0123 
(0.73) 
0.0133 
(0.78) 
PHD 
-0.0014 
(-0.10) 
-0.0010 
(-0.07) 
-0.0009 
(-0.07) 
-0.0036 
(-0.26) 
Independent 
-0.0040 
(-0.40) 
-0.0044 
(-0.43) 
-0.0041 
(-0.41) 
-0.0037 
(-0.37) 
Equity 
0.0150 
(1.06) 
0.0155 
(1.09) 
0.0145 
(1.02) 
0.0149 
(1.05) 
New Expertise 
-0.0065 
(-0.69) 
-0.0071 
(-0.74) 
-0.0061 
(-0.65) 
-0.0059 
(-0.62) 
New Qualification 
0.0141 
(1.41) 
0.0135 
(1.36) 
0.0133 
(1.33) 
0.0136 
(1.37) 
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New Seat 
0.0085 
(0.98) 
0.0083 
(0.96) 
0.0095 
(1.08) 
0.0082 
(0.94) 
Interlock 
-0.0170 
(-1.97)* 
-0.0163 
(-1.85)* 
-0.0114 
(-1.28) 
-0.0173 
(-1.87)* 
CEO involved 
0.0011 
(0.17) 
0.0014 
(0.20) 
0.0014 
(0.21) 
0.0012 
(0.17) 
Chair-CEO duality 
-0.0196 
(-1.27) 
-0.0192 
(-1.24) 
-0.0197 
(-1.28) 
-0.0197 
(-1.28) 
CEO tenure 
-0.0011 
(-1.63) 
-0.0011 
(-1.63) 
-0.0011 
(-1.73)* 
-0.0010 
(-1.48) 
Independent Board 
-0.0016 
(-0.19) 
-0.0015 
(-0.17) 
-0.0011 
(-0.13) 
-0.0018 
(-0.21) 
Firm Size 
-0.0004 
(-0.19) 
-0.0005 
(-0.24) 
-0.0003 
(-0.16) 
-0.0004 
(-0.17) 
Return on Assets 
-0.0085 
(-0.49) 
-0.0085 
(-0.49) 
-0.0091 
(-0.52) 
-0.0073 
(-0.42) 
Market-to-Book 
0.0007 
(0.47) 
0.0006 
(0.44) 
0.0005 
(0.37) 
0.0069 
(0.47) 
Adj-R2 0.021 0.025 0.023 0.023 
n 423 423 423 423 
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Table 5 – Hiring Board Experience 
Each panel displays six coefficients from six different regression specifications. The columns display the coefficients from 
specifications 1, 2 and 4 from Table 4 on subsamples with less than and greater than median levels of various measures of board 
experience. The sample comprises 423 non-executive director appointments to Australian Stock Exchange listed companies 
between 1 January 2004 and 30 June 2006. Director and hiring board data is sourced from company annual reports on the 
Connect4 Annual Report database. Hiring firm financial data is from Aspect. Share price data is sourced from Sirca. See Table 1 
for variable definitions. Models include robust standard errors. T-statistics are in parentheses. Significance at * 10%, ** 5% and 
*** 1%. 
Panel A – Board Tenure 
 
Board tenure <=4 years 
(n=220) 
Board tenure >4 years 
(n=203) 
Directorships 
0.0117 
(2.33)** 
0.0020 
(0.46) 
Dir2+ 
0.0310 
(1.96)* 
0.0149 
(1.39) 
Dir2+Yr4+ 
0.0301 
(2.28)** 
0.0017 
(0.10) 
  
Panel B – CEO Tenure 
 
CEO tenure <=3 years 
(n=230) 
CEO tenure >3 years 
(n=193) 
Directorships 
0.0158 
(3.67)*** 
-0.0028 
(-0.58) 
Dir2+ 
0.0421 
(3.31)*** 
0.0019 
(0.15) 
Dir2+Yr4+ 
0.0363 
(3.19)*** 
-0.0045 
(-0.24) 
 
Panel C – Board Years 
 
Board years <=26 
(n=215) 
Board years >26 
(n=208) 
Directorships 
0.0132 
(2.42)** 
0.0021 
(0.49) 
Dir2+ 
0.0432 
(2.63)*** 
0.0069 
(0.64) 
Dir2+Yr4+ 
0.0511 
(3.70)*** 
-0.0081 
(-0.65) 
      
Panel D – Board Directorships 
 
Board directorships <=3 
(n=249) 
Board directorships >3 
(n=174) 
Directorships 
0.0075 
(1.19) 
0.0061 
(1.55) 
Dir2+ 
0.0283 
(1.50) 
0.0156 
(1.49) 
Dir2+Yr4+ 
0.0222 
(1.31) 
0.0162 
(1.21) 
 
Panel E – Board Dir2+Yr4+    
 
Board Dir2+Yr4+ = 0 
(n=247) 
Board Dir2+Yr4+ = 1 
 (n=176) 
Directorships 
0.0113 
(2.06)** 
0.0033 
(0.76) 
Dir2+ 
0.0320 
(2.09)** 
0.0135 
(1.16) 
Dir2+Yr4+ 
0.0255 
(1.77)* 
0.0111 
(0.76) 
 
